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Abstract
This paper develops a model in which it is possible to evaluate alternatives
of human capital …nancing. The alternative systems under discussion are: total
feeing; graduates taxes and uniform taxes (this can be associated to the scheme
presently used in the Argentina universitary system).
Assessment of the alternatives is performed over welfare, based on the indi-
cators of poverty, equality, equity (justice in the distribution) and the average
levels of utility and wealth. Likewise, the functions of welfare presented by
Bentham, Rawls, Atkinson, Sen and Kakwani are also considered.
The most remarkable results are obtained through the simulation of an
economy under three scenarios. In that way, the system of graduates taxation
is found to be better for welfare; whereas the system of uniform taxation only
can be justi…ed as it maximises the number of students. In addition, an analysis
of political economy in this model helps to understand why a system of uniform
taxation can be sustainable on the time.
JEL classi…cation: H1, I2, E62, O15
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1 Introduction
In the last years, there were opinions given by international education organizations
asking for some reform on the universitary …nancing system. Such as it is cited
by Ennis and Porto (2001), J.C. Tedesco (Director of the International Institute for
Education Planning of the UNESCO) stated that ‘what is really dramatic is that the
university -a fundamental institution in the pocesses of production and distribution
of knowledge- does not assume the debate over the necessary reform that will make
the changes deep, speedy and in the direction demanded by the current situation in
the country... The University owes the society this debate’. In the same trend, the
sociologist J.J. Brunner stated that ‘what should be done is to go beyond the myths
and say overtly that a free university generates inequity. If we do not, it will be very
di¢cult to try to conceive some more reasonable policy to …nance our institutions of
higher education’.1 In addition, Jacques Attali -former advisor to president François
Mitterrand and chairperson of a comittee that proposed new structures for higher
education in France- made some interesting comments during his stay in Buenos
Aires with reference to the functioning of Latin American universities. According to
Attali: ‘some universities have chosen to be the best in the world and for that reason
they are obligated to select not only the best teachers but also the best students in the
world. The rest of the universities -mass universities- are no more than a camou‡age
of unemployment’.2
From the economic point of view, it is clearly seen that even though supporters
of each of the systems can be really enthusiastic about them, there is no theory from
which they stem.3 Particularly, there is no single model that can show that sustaining
public university is desirable or that it could be better to establish any of the other
alternatives. This omission is relevant due to the possible lack of problems associated
with the present system and the need to o¤er some theoretical or explanatory model
that can possibly deal with the advantages of the alternative systems.
In general, the economic study of educational aspects has been started out of three
perspectives. The …rst one has been to consider education as a consumption decision.
The second one has been to approach education as a signal of the individuals’ unseen
capacity. Finally, the perspective to be used in this study will be to consider education
as a decision of investment in human capital.
1‘Clarín’ Newspaper, February 2002.
2As quoted in ‘La Nación’, 6th September 2002.
3The term theory is used as Lucas (1988): ‘I prefer the term theory in a very narrow sense, to
refer to an explicit dynamic system, something that can be put on a computer and run’.
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There are models or theories available which are part of the literature on in-
vestment in human capital and whose seminal work is Becker (1964). They can be
separated, according to Aghion and Howitt (1998), into two structures or frameworks.
The …rst one is the ‘Lucas approach’4 in which growth is achieved through the accu-
mulation of human capital; the second is the ‘Nelson and Phelps approach’5 where
growth is mainly understood through the human capital stock. This last approach
has been renewed by the Shumpeterians.
Within this classi…cation, the present work belongs to the ‘Lucas approach’. For
that reason, Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) and Galor and Zeira (1993) are the nec-
essary reference.
Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) present a model of overlapping generations with
heterogeneous agents. The latter can di¤er in their incomes and abilities. Within this
framework, endogenous human capital investment in a system of formal education
is the driver of growth. The main results obtained are the following: (a) income
inequality, as measured by its variance and which shows a greater fall under a system
of public education; (b) higher per-capita incomes resulting from private education,
except when the initial inequality is ‘extremely high’; (c) societies with most of their
agents with incomes below average will opt for the public education system.
Galor and Zeira (1993) analyse how income and wealth distribution are related
to long-term macroeconomic issues, such as growth and adjustment among sectors,
by means of the inclusion of investment in human capital and inter-generational
altruism. This is analysed in a model of overlapping generations where agents can
be di¤erenciated form each other on the sole basis of their initial wealth. In general
terms, this analysis demostrates that initial distributions of wealth and income a¤ect
product and investment in the short and long terms.
Following by analogy to Lucas (1988), rather than o¤er you some of our opinions
about human capital …nancing in Argentina, we simply made a system and let you
watch it unfold. We hope you found it convincing on its own terms. The clarity with
which these e¤ects can be seen is the key advantage of operating in simpli…ed, …ctional
worlds. The disadvantage, it must be conceded, is that we are not really interested in
understanding human capital …nancing in a hypothetical context. We are interested
in our own, vastly more complicated society. To apply the knowledge we have gained
about human capital …nancing, we must be willing to argue by analogy from what
we know about one situation to what we would like to know about another, quite
4Due to Lucas (1988).
5Due to Nelson and Phelps (1964).
2
di¤erent situation. And, as we all know, the analogy that one person …nds persuasive,
his neighbor may well …nd ridiculous. Consequently, it is obvious that who approve
of some of the systems of university …nancing can be skeptical about the implications
the model herein presented to university …nancing. We do not know what one can
do about it, except keep trying ‘to tell better and better stories’, to provide the raw
material for better and more instructive analogies.
The organization of our work is as follows.
First, in the section 2, the model of overlapping generations with heterogeneous
agents in relation to their abilities (tendency to work) and inheritance is presented.
The structure of the model, the dynamics, the equilibrium and the steady state in the
case of total fees (the basic case) are described. After that, solutions are found to the
di¤erent systems of …nancing (uniform taxation and graduates taxation). The fourth
section compares the previously mentioned alternatives. In the …rst place, results
from the steady state are compared. After that, a numerical example is developed
and results related to equality, poverty, equity (taken as justice for distribution),6
levels of utility, wealth and welfare (de…ned through several functions) are found.
The next section analyses the implementability of the reforms. In particular, in
this section is stated how a reform from the steady state with Public University to
graduates taxation or fee would be achivied. Section 6 discuss the basic assumptions.
The last section presents some comments for Argentina. Appendix A presents all the
proofs, Appendix B some …gures and Appendix C the exercise of political economy.
6There is some growing disagreement in the literature over considering income equality a con-
ception of equity (Le Grand (1991), Benabou (2000) and Phelan (2002)). Equality is a descriptive
concept, whereas equity is a normative one, maybe more related to ‘justice in income distribution’
or ‘social justice’. As it is mentioned in Le Grand (1991), income equality does not imply neither
is implied by distributive equity. It is not fair that two people who make a di¤erent e¤ort and/or
have a di¤erent performance may earn the same salary. Similarly, it is unfair that two people who
do the same job and with the same e¢ciency, under the same circumstances may earn di¤erent
salaries.Since a normative concept, such as equity, has to be exactly de…ned in order to be de-
scriptive, Benabou (2000) establishes ‘equity’ as the equality of opportunities and ‘equality’ as the
equality of results. The most important …nding from this work is that there is no trade-o¤ between
equity and e¢ciency since levelling opportunities also improves product growth. However, this last
result di¤eres partly from what was found by Phelan (2002), where the decision behind the veil
of the ignorance of Rawls (1971) is used as a criterium of justice.The most striking …nding is that
justice in that sense implies not only inequality of results but eventually, also of opportunities.
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2 The Model
A model in which it will be possible to evaluate the implications over welfare of the
alternative systems for …nancing investment in human capital is introduced in this
section.
The model introduced here makes use of an analytical structure similar to that of
Galor and Zeira (1993) in which di¤erent systems of human capital …nancing might
be analysed. Unlike Galor and Zeira (1993), heterogeneity is added to the abilities
in order to try to improve the adjustment of this model to reality. In addtion, the
present work di¤ers from Galor and Zeira (1993) in the subject of investigation.
Although the present model is used in this context to analyse alternatives for
…nancing higher education, it is so general that it can also be used in other contexts.
For example, deciding to invest may be interpreted as an investment to participate
in the formal sector of the economy in which salaries are higher.
However, this model has certain peculiarities that allow us to associate it with a
context in which alternatives for higher education are studied. Contrary to Caucutt
and Kumar (2000) who studied schemes of subsidies for education in the US, in
the present model, the decision of investing is taken by the agents that will attend
university other than their parents. Note that the latter is more likely true in the case
of university education. Besides, the di¤erence between studying and not studying
can be associated to the di¤erence between professionals and not professionals, which
is more unlikely to occur in other levels of education.
2.1 Framework
In each generation there is a continuum of agents of size 1. Each generation lives two
periods. Each of the agents has a child, for which reason the size of the population is
constant. Those agents born in t, live together in t+ 1 with their children (who are
born at the beginning of this period). That is the reason why it is said that there are
overlapping generations in the model.
The use of overlapping generations is very convenient because it allows for an
analysis of cohorts (Browning, Hansen and Heckman, 1999). As it will be seen in this
case, the analysis will be focused on the evolution of the distributions of wealth and
utility of the generations. At the same time, the study of two overlapping generations
is an abstract to study those groups in detail. In order to think about the economy
of reality, it could be reinterpreted as if there were many groups in which the same
happened.
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There is only one consumption good that can be produced with two alternative
technologies. There is perfect competence in the market of goods and factors.
The …rst technology makes use of labor only by uneducated people (unskilled
work). Production with this technology in the period t is Y ut . Under equilibrium wu
is the salary of unskilled workers which is supposed to be constant.
The other technology makes use of labor only from educated people (skilled work).
Production with this technology in the period t is Y st . Under equilibrium, ws is the
salary of skilled workers. However, skilled workers are di¤erenciated by variable ¯i,
so the skilled worker i obtains ¯iws.
¯i is a variable that di¤ers among the agents and that represents the abilities
and/or the tendency to e¤ort on the part of the agent. This variable re‡ects the
performance at work and for that reason it is said to be constituted by innate abilities
such as tendency to make e¤orts (both an agent who is ready to work focused every
hour in the day and a very intelligent agent would give a very high value for this
variable).
It is important that ¯i is correlated across generations. We adopt, such as Ace-
moglu (2001), a particularly simple form of this here, and asume that the type of
agents do not change across generations, i.e., ¯i;t = ¯i;t¡1 for all i and for all t:
The agent i knows the value of ¯ from his birth. For this reason it is considered
when deciding whether to invest in human capital or not.7
It will be taken that ¯i takes values in the interval [¯min; ¯max], in relation to the
distribution L(¯) determined in period 0, with a function of density l(¯), so thatZ ¯max
¯min
l(¯)d¯ = 1
Thus, an agent born in the period t has two options: (a) to work both periods
as a unskilled worker (in t and t+ 1) or (b) to invest in human capital (education)
when young (in t) and work as a skilled worker when they are grown -ups (in t+1).8
Members from the same dynasty are related by inheritance since the agents derive
pro…ts from the inheritance left to the children. Such as it is stated by Mulligan
(1997), parents will decide on how to divide their resources between themselves and
their children. Since parents will be in‡uenced by the economic success of their
children, they would like to pass onto them such resources that might contribute to
7Note that as ¯ is known, there is no uncertainty over the performance of education. In Ril-
laers and Durán (2002) the decision of investing in human capital is taken under uncertainty over
performance.
8Note that investment in human capital is indivisible.
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that objective. However, not all their resources are passed on to their children due
to the fact that the desire for the progress of the latter is balanced with the desire of
spending on themselves.
Thus, the preferences of an agent born in the periord t are represented by
uti(ct+1i; bti) = ® ln ct+1i + (1 - ®) ln bti
where ct+1 is consumption when being an elderly person in t + 1 (does not consider
consumption when young) and bt is the inheritance left onto their children that will
be born at the beginning of t+ 1 (during t+ 1 lives together with their children).
Agents are endowed with 1 unity of time in each period 9 and with the wealth they
inherit from their parents. That is to say, if xt is the initial wealth of an agent born
in t, so xt = bt - 1 where bt - 1 is the inheritance left by their parents. The variable xt,
which will be called wealth, will have a distribution in t that will be referred to as Ft
with a function of density ft (note that f0 is the function of initial density of wealth
for generation 0, which is supposed to be continuos). In this way, we wil have thatZ 1
0
ft(x)dx = 1 for all t
It should be also noted in the same way that those agents born in the period t, live
at the time as their parents who were born in t ¡ 1. In this way, the population in
the period t will be, Z 1
0
ft¡1(x)dx+
Z 1
0
ft(x)dx = 2
As from the function of wealth distribution (F (x)) and the ability-tendency to make
e¤orts (L(¯)), which are independent during the period 0, there is a function of joint
distribution over (x; ¯), that will be called M(x; ¯).
We will assume that the agents are able to place any quantity at the international
rate r. However, due to some reasons related to imperfections in the international
market of credits, if they are willing to go into debt, they will have to pay interest
rates i > r. This is due to the monitoring of investments in intangible assets.10 This
assumption is not very strong since, such as Ennis and Porto (2001) point out, the
market of credits for students is often virtually non-existant.
Agents maximaze their utility. Supposing that yt is the income at the end of the
period t + 1 of an agent born in t, they will be able to decide on their consumption
9Given that inutility of work or utility of leisure are not considered here, the agentrs will de…nitely
devote their endowment of time to study or work. Leisure is incorporated, for example, in Glomm
and Ravikumar (1992).
10This charateristic of the …nancial market is equal to Galor and Zeira (1993).
6
and their optimum inheritance. For this reason, the problem of the agent has to be
expounded
Max
ct+1;bt
® ln ct+1i + (1 - ®) ln bti s.t. yt = ct+1 + bt
From the Lagrangean and the FOC, it is possible to operate in order to obtain,
ct+1 = ®yt ; bt = (1¡ ®)yt
The homoteticity of the relation consumption-inheritance in relation to the income,
such as it is used here, is being discussed by Mulligan (1997) who presents a model
in which he makes altruism endogenous. Consequently, in his analysis the proportion
of wealth that parents leave to their children is not independent from the level of
income.
Investment in human capital when the agents are young costs h, which represents
both the direct expenditures (such as fees) and the indirect ones (that is to say,
accomodation expenses, books, etc.).11 Such as it is stated by Galor and Zeira (1993)
in order to lead the system towards a steady state from any initial distribution it will
be necessary to suppose that the minimum income that a skilled worker can generate
is higher than the one that he can obtain working both periods as a non-skilled one
and placing h at the interest rate r.12
Assumption 1: ¯minws ¸ wu(2 + r) + h(1 + r).
Likewise, it is supposed that the active interest rate is ‘higher enough´ than the
passive rate.
Assumption 2: (1¡ ®)(1 + i) > 1 > (1¡ ®)(1 + r)
2.2 Equilibrium
There will be three kinds of agents in the equilibrium of each period, according to
their decision of investing in human capital and the possibility of …nancing that
investment with their own resources. They will be de…ned in relation to their utility
and inheritance as follows.
11Since the literature over university …nancing has pointed at the need to make ‘knowledge public’,
the present work -so as not to get involved in this discussion- introduces the alternatives over how
to …nance human capital and does not make reference to more or less public and private sector
intervention.
12Note that in accordance to this assumption, if the market of capitals were perfect, there would
not be restriction to studying deriving from the initial wealth and even the agent with ¯min would
choose to study.
7
De…nition 1 Those who will not invest in human capital (unskilled) and will work
as unskilled during both periods. For them, the level of utility will be Uu and the
inheritance will be bu. In this case their level of utility will be
Uu = ln [(x+ wu) (1 + r) + wu] + "
Where " = ® ln® + (1 - ®) ln(1 - ®): At the same time it is possible to …nd the
inheritance that parents leave to their children,
bu = (1 - ®) [(x+ wu) (1 + r) + wu]
De…nition 2 Those with xt ¸ h that will invest in human capital and will lend. For
them, the level of utility will be U sland the inheritance will be bsl.
U sl = ln [ws¯ + (x - h)(1 + r)] + "
bsl = (1 - ®) [ws¯ + (x - h)(1 + r)]
De…nition 3 Those who, even when having x < h will invest in human capital
borrowing what they lack at the interest rate i. For them, the level of utility will be
U sb and the inheritance will be bsb.
Usb = ln [ws¯ + (x - h)(1 + i)] + "
bsb = (1 - ®) [ws¯ + (x - h)(1 + i)]
Under each period, the decision of investing in human capital will be made taking
into account the initial wealth (x) and the ability / tendency to make e¤orts (¯), as
a whole. Those who are better o¤ will be more likely to study due to the fact that
they will not need to borrow any money, and that investment will be pro…table based
on assumption 1. Similarly, those who are ´more skillful-hardworking’ will require a
lower level of initial wealth since their future returns will be higher.
In this way, a value of x in function of ¯ will be found, by means of which agents
will decide in favor of investing in human capital, doing Uu = U sl.
Proposition 1 There is for each dynasty a q in function of ¯,
q(¯) =
[wu (2 + r) + (1 + i) h - ws¯]
i - r
so that its members will invest in education as long as their initial wealth obtained as
inheritance is higher.
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Once q(¯) is known, it is possible to compute the quantity of agents who decide
in favor of studying and those who decide against it. It is for that reason that the
function of density conditioned to ¯ is previously de…ned asm(x k ¯) and the function
of joint distribution conditioned to the values of ¯ as M(x k ¯).
Those quali…ed from the generation born in t will be those who will have x higher
than q(¯) for all the possible values of ¯,
Pt =
Z ¯max
¯min
Z 1
qt(¯)
mt(x k ¯)dxd¯
=
Z ¯max
¯min
[1 - Mt(qt(¯) k ¯)] d¯
The complement (1 - Pt) will be those who do not qualify in t:
2.3 Dynamics
Once the structure of the model and the equilibrium during each period are known
it is possible to …nd out what the dynamics of individual wealths will be like. It will
be clearly seen that the three types of agents have di¤erent dynamics, as follows,
xt+1
8><>:
bu(xt) = (1 - ®) [(xt + wu) (1 + r) + wu]
bsb(xt) = (1 - ®) [ws¯ + (xt - h)(1 + i)]
bsl(xt) = (1 - ®) [ws¯ + (xt - h)(1 + r)]
if xt < q(¯)
if q(¯) · xt < h
if h · xt
Note that bu and bsl have the same slope (in function of x) and that at the same time,
according to assumption 2, the latter is smaller than that from bsb. These aspects
will be made clearer by observing Figure 1.
The previous …gure shows the limit values that q can take in relation to the values
of ¯. It is also seen there that the higher ¯ is, the lower the level of initial wealth
the agents should have in order to decide whether to study or not- it will be more
pro…table. In that sense, it is clearly seen that it is more likely that a person invests
in human capital when his or her parent’s income (from which inheritance is just a
proportion) increases as well as when the ability / tendency to work is higher.
2.4 Steady State
In order to …nd the steady state in the …rst place, it is necessary to note that there will
be an initial value of wealth as from which -for higher values- all future generations
will remain skilled. According to this value, it will be possible to know the limit
distribution of wealth and incomes through the initial distributions of x and ¯. Such
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x t 
x t+1 
bu 
bsb(βmax) 
bsl(βmin) 
       q(βmax)  ρ(βmax)  q(βmin)   ρ(βmin) 
bsb(βmin) 
bsl(βmax) 
Figure 1: Division Values of Wealth
as it can be seen from Figure 1, it is necessary to do xt+1 = xt in the function bsb(xt)
in order to …nd that value.
Proposition 2 There is a point ½ for each agent
½(¯) =
(1 - ®) [h(1 + i) - ws¯]
(1 - ®)(1 + i) - 1
so that if in any period t, xt < ½ (xt > ½i) for the member of any dynasty, so in the
limit the future generatios from this dynasty will be unskilled (skilled)
Apart from a value of initial wealth (in function of ¯) that enables identi…cation
of what proportion of people qualify, the levels of steady state are likely to be found.
In accordance with the assumptions, there will be a level of initial wealth in a
steady states which is the same for all unskilled workers. As can be seen in Figure 2,
this derives from xt+1 = xt in the function bu(xt).
Proposition 3 The level of wealth (x) of steady state for those agents with x0 < ½
will be:
xncss =
(1 - ®)wu(2 + r)
1 - (1 - ®)(1 + r)
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Likewise, the value of initial wealth in steady state for skilled workers is also likely
to be found. However, in this case it will not be a unique value since it will di¤er in
relation to ¯ in each dynasty.
Proposition 4 Wealth levels (x) at a steady state for those agents with x0 > ½ will
be:
xsl;ass (¯) =
(1 - ®) [ws¯ - h(1 + r)]
1 - (1 - ®)(1 + r)
In accordance with the previous propositions and Figure 2, wealth distribution
under steady states (ss) will be likely to be found. It must be observed for that a
proportion of the agents (speci…cally those who have x0 < ½(¯)) will be poor unskilled
with a level of wealth xuss, whereas the rest of the population (those who have had
x0 > ½(¯)) will have incomes around some value (depending their ¯) within the
interval
h
xslss(¯min); x
sl
ss(¯max)
i
.13
x t 
x t+1 
bu 
bsb(βmax) bsl(βmin) 
x slss (βmin)                          x slss (βmax) 
There is a continuous of skill agents  
bsb(βmin) 
    x uss 
Poor, 
unskill  
bsl(βmax) 
Figure 2: Limit distribution of wealth
Thus, the function of density of distribution at steady state can be written only
as a function of parameters. In the …rst place, all those agents that in the initial
distribution of wealth (F0) have incomes lower than their value of ½(¯) are found in
13Note that according to assumption 1 it is veri…ed that xncee < x
c
ee(¯min).
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xss = x
u
ss. Afterwards, there will agents within the interval
h
xslss(¯min); x
sl
ss(¯max)
i
, in
relation to the number of agents with each value of ¯
fee(x) =
8><>:
F0(½(e¯))
[1 - F0(½(¯(x))] l(¯(x))
0
if xss = xuss
if xslss(¯min) · xss · xslss(¯max)
in another case
where in order to establish how many agents are found in each value of x, the inverse
function of xcee(¯) is used, that is to say ¯(x). At the same time,
e¯ , which is equal to
the mean of ¯; is used in order to see how many agents are concentrated in xee = xncee
e¯ = Z ¯max
¯min
l(¯)¯d¯
Having this information and de…ning distributions in particular it is possible to
compute the …nal distribution only in function of parameters. As an example, as-
suming that ¯ » U [¯min; ¯max] and x » U [0; x] and that both distributions are
independent in t = 0, it is possible to write
fee(x) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
(1 - ®)[h(1+i) - ws0:5(¯max - ¯min)]
[(1 - ®)(1+i) - 1]x if xee = x
nc
eeh
[(1 - ®)(1+i) - 1]x - (1 - ®)[h(1+i) - ws0:5(¯max - ¯min)]
[(1 - ®)(1+i) - 1](¯max - ¯min)
i
if xcee(¯min) · xee · xcee (¯max)
0 in any other case
3 Alternative Solutions
Once the structure has been expounded and the basic case solved (from now onwards
called total fee) it is possible to …nd the solutions to the model under di¤erent …nanc-
ing schemes for the investment in human capital: uniform taxation and graduates
taxation. Another system to investigate would be ‘picking the winners’. However,
the interest in this policy is reduced if the problems of implementability of this system
are considered. As Lucas (1988) stated ‘In the model, picking the winners is easy. If
only it were so in reality!’.
What the di¤erent schemes analyzed in the section have in common is that a
subsidy (s) is granted and it is …nanced with an indebtment taken by the government
at the interest rate ig which is subsequently paid by taxing adults. Even though this
will be later discussed more deeply, it is worth pointing out that the assumption will
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be that i ¸ ig > r: In addition, to introduce the government in a rationally way we
do the assumption 3.
Assumption 3: ¯minws > (1 + ig)h
In addition, it is assumed that the subsidy is not total 14, so that the cost the
agents face when deciding whether to study or not is said to be (1 - s)h. The fact
that the amount of the subsidy can be charged during the following period allows for
no alteration in intergenerational equity. Thus, the generation that enjoys and makes
pro…ts from the subsidy is the same that …nances it.
The goverment …xes the tax rate (¿) over the tax base (It) so as to comply with
the following budget constrains:
hsPt =
Bt+1
1 + ig
Bt = ¿ tIt
Where Bt is the indebtedness taken in t ¡ 1 at the rate ig, due in t and Pt the
proportion of agents that decide to qualify during t. Thus, it can be written,
¿ t =
(1 + ig)hsPt-1
It
Since for both the taxation for graduates and the taxation for all the population,
the tax base (It) depend on how many and who of the agents study and, in order
to answer these two questions it is necessary to know the tax rate (¿ t), the ¿ t of
equilibrium (¿¤t ) must be de…ned carefully:
De…nition 4 ¿ t of equilibrium is that ¿ ¤t for which if the agents take ¿
¤
t as given and
decide consequently (determine It), it is veri…ed that if the government applies ¿ ¤t the
budget restrictions will be satis…ed.
In the di¤erent cases that follow several alternatives are presented over It and the
solutions are subsequently found.
3.1 Uniform taxes
An alternative for …nancing higher education is to obtain resources from applying
a uniform rate over the incomes of all the adult generation. Consequently, since
14If s = 1, the subsidy is total and according to the assumptiom 1 all agents will choose to study.
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taxes are charged with uniform rate (¿) to all adults, the budget restrictions of the
government during the period t will be:
Bt = ¿ t
h
ws b¯t¡1Pt-1 + wu(1 - Pt-1)i
hsPt =
Bt+1
1 + ig
Where b¯t is the value of the mean of ¯ of those who qualify during the period t.15
From then onwards, it can be said that the taxation rate will depend on the number
of students, as follows,
¿ut =
(1 + ig)hsPt¡1h
ws b¯t¡1Pt-1 + wu(1 - Pt-1)i
It can be seen here that the values of qt are modi…ed
Proposition 5 Under a system of partial subsidy and uniform taxes, it can be seen
that
qut (¯) =
wu(2 + r - ¿ut ) + h(1 - s)(1 + i) - ws¯(1 - ¿
u
t )
i - r
At the same time, the steady state can be characterized under this alternative, as
from the values of ½u and xss.
Proposition 6 Under a system of partial subsidy and uniform taxes, the values that
characterize the steady state will be
½u(¯) =
(1 - ®) [h(1 - s)(1 + i) - ws¯(1 - ¿u)]
(1 + i)(1 - ®) - 1
xu;uss =
(1 - ®)(2 + r - ¿u)wu
1 - (1 - ®)(1 + r)
xsl;uss (¯) =
(1 - ®) [ws¯(1 - ¿u) - h(1 - s)(1 + r)]
1 - (1 - ®)(1 + r)
15Note that even ¯ and x are independent at time zero, the mean of ¯ those agents who study is
higher than the total mean of ¯ (that is to say E [¯==x > ½(¯)] > E [¯]):
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3.2 Graduate taxes
As an alternative to the previous system, it is possible to analyze another one where
those who pay in order to …nance the University are the same people who attend it.
Here, it can be stated that:
Bt = ¿ tws b¯gt¡1Pt-1
hsPt =
Bt+1
1 + ig
Where b¯gt is the value of the mean of ¯ of those who qualify during the period t in
this sytem. From there, it can be obtained that
¿ gt =
(1 + ig)hs
ws b¯gt¡1
In this case, it is also possible to …nd how the values of qt are modi…ed
Proposition 7 Under a system of partial subsidy and graduate taxes, it can be proved
that
qgt (¯) =
wu(2 + r) + h(1 - s)(1 + i) - ws¯(1 - ¿
g
t )
i - r
Now, in order to …nish the charaterization of the solution to this scheme, the sole
calculation of the values of ½u and xss remains .
Proposition 8 Under a system of partial subsidy and graduate taxes, the values
characterizing the steady state will be
½g(¯) =
(1 - ®) [h(1 - s)(1 + i)¡ ws¯(1 - ¿ g)]
(1 + i)(1 - ®)¡ 1
xu;gss =
(1 - ®)(2 + r)wu
1 - (1 - ®)(1 + r)
xsl;gss (¯) =
(1 - ®) [ws¯(1 - ¿ g) - h(1 - s)(1 + r)]
1 - (1 - ®)(1 + r)
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4 Evaluation of alternatives
The alternatives of …nancing human capital presented in the previous sections will
be compared in this section. Such comparison will mainly be made in two ways. In
the …rst place, certain endogenous variables are evaluated in the steady state, which
allows to caracterize the solution. Then, the solution to the model for each period
is to be found according to a set of parameters that are previously determined. In
this last exercise, the distribution of wealth of each generation is obtained. Thus, the
alternatives will be able to be compared according to various welfare indicators.
4.1 In the steady state
The comparison of alternatives for …nancing human capital investment in the steady
state does not allow, in most cases, to obtain results free from ambiguities. However,
it is highly useful to know on what grounds one alternative is better than the other.
The properties of the endogenous variables [½; xc; xnc] allow for the characteriza-
tion of wealth distribution in the steady state.
Notwithstanding, before starting, it is possible to plan an innocuous assumption
that simpli…es the comparison in algebraic terms. In that sense, it is supposed that
the initial wealth distribution is such that there exists a proportion of people below
and above ½ for the three systems.
Assumption 4:
R ½i
0 ft(x)dx > 0 and besides
R1
½i ft(x)dx > 0 for i = a; g; u:
4.1.1 Comparison of alternatives according to ½
This is the most di¢cult comparision due to the fact that ½ is a value of x which is
a function of ¯.
Proposition 9 There will exist a greater proportion (amount) of poor people in the
fees system compared to the system of uniform taxes and graduates. In adittion,
there will be a greater proportion (amount) of poor people in the system of garaduates
taxation compared to the system of uniform taxation. Is is that
½a¯ > ½g(¯) > ½u(¯ee) r ¯ in the interval [¯min; ¯max]
The Figure 3 makes this point clear. In this …gure, everybody above the lines will
remain skilled, therefore, the proof of the last proposition is to show that this …gure
is correct. As a result of comparing ‘the proportion that decide to study’ between
the graduates taxation and uniform taxation systems, it is found that will be higher
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under the system of uniform taxation. Such result is very intuitive, as in this case
the cost of contracting a debt is the same (ig), consequently, the fact that those who
do not study pay part of the education cost within the system of uniform taxation,
reduces its cost. In addition, it is found that “the proportion that decides to study”
will be higher in the systems of taxation compared to the fees system. This result is
intuitive if it is considered that the rate at which those who are on the verge of when
deciding whether to study or not are endebted to, is higher in the case of total feeing.
β 
  X0 
 
X max 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X min 
 
  βmin                     βmax 
Fee       
Graduates 
Uniform
Figure 3: Comparison of alternatives according to ½
Conclusion 1 The previous propositions indicate that the system of uniform taxation
maximizes the proportion (amount) of students.
4.1.2 Comparison of alternatives according to xuee
As far as the wealth level of those who decide to study is concerned, the comparison
will be simpler. The reason is that it is possible to make the comparison independently
from the values taken as parameters.
The wealth value of those who decide not to study will be the same in the cases
of graduates fees and taxations, and less in the case of uniform taxation. The expla-
nation is very simple: it is the last in the unique system in which they have to pay
taxes.
Proposition 10 It is possible to demonstrate that xu;gee = x
u;a
ee > x
u;u
ee :
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Conclusion 2 Together with the previous conclusion, it is possible to mention that
even though in the system of uniform taxation fewer poor people are found, those who
remain in this situation are poorer (their income after taxes is lower).
4.1.3 Comparison of alternatives according to xslee
The wealth level of those quali…ed will di¤er between the several systems according to
the value of some parameters. The comparison of the di¤erent values of xslee is made
considering a value of ¯ as given, which will be supposed, in most cases by simplicity
equal to the mean of the agents that decide to study under the system of uniform
taxation (b¯).16
In the …rst place, it is observed that the wealth level of the quali…ed in the steady
level will be higher in the scheme of uniform taxation than in the system of gradu-
ates´taxation, provided there exist unskill (who will pay part of the cost of receiving
education under the system of uniform taxation).
Proposition 11 The wealth of the steady state of the quali…ed is higher under the
system of uniform taxation than in the system of graduates taxation xsl;uee (
b¯) > xc;gee (b¯):
In turn, wealth of steady state of the quali…ed will be higher under the feeing
system than in the system of graduates taxation.17
Proposition 12 It is con…rmed that the wealth of the steady state of those qual-
i…ed is higher under the feeing system than in the system of graduates taxation³
xsl;aee (
b¯) > xsl;gee ( b¯)´ :
Finally, it is possible to compare wealth in steady state of those quali…ed in the
feeing and uniform taxation systems. In this case, we …nd that wealth in the feeing
system will be higher than in the system of uniform taxation only when
(1 + ig)A > (1 + r)
16Note that if xcee under a given system (for example x
c;A
ee ) is higher than x
c
ee under another system
(for example xc;Bee ) with a given value of ¯ (for example ¯
¤)
xc;Aee (¯
¤) > xc;Bee (¯
¤)
so, it is con…rmed that
xc;Aee (¯) > x
c;B
ee (¯) for all ¯
17In this case, for the sake of simplicity, the comparison for ¯ given is made in the level of the
mean of those who study in the system of graduates taxation.
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where A = ws
b¯
eeP
u
ee
wu(1 - Puee)+ws¯Puee
is the proportion of the cost of education that graduates
pay in the system of uniform taxation.
4.2 Using numerical examples
Considering that the equations describing the system dynamics are non-linear, it is
not possible to apply a major analytical characterization. Consequently, numerical
examples are used in this section to compare the solutions in the di¤erent systems.
In order to obtain the results in terms of numbers, values for the model parameters
and for certain variables in t = 0 have to be established. In Table 3 the determined
values are introduced, with which the results presented afterwards are obtained.
Table 3: Values for simulation
Variables
¯ :Ability-E¤ort
x0 :Initial wealth
s : Proportion subsidized
h :Cost of education
r :Passive interest rate
i :Private cost for …nancing HK
ig :Public Cost for …nancing HK
wu :Salary of the non-quali…ed
ws :Salary of the quali…ed
® :Proportion of inheritance
Case 1
logN(1:16; 0:19)
U(4:1; 2:3)
30%
5:5
12%
180%
144%
1
9
50%
Case 2
logN(1:16; 0:19)
U(4:1; 2:3)
30%
5:5
12%
180%
54%
1
9
50%
Distribution of ¯ is assumed to be log normal, in order to allow that very few of
them have extremely high values. Initial wealth (x0) is supposed to have a uniform
distribution even knowing that in the di¤erent economies it usually resembles a nor-
mal log. This last thing is justi…ed because we pretend to start the analysis from a
situation where ‘the forces of the market’ have not yet acted to distribute wealth.
The value of s is deliberately chosen to be small enough to re‡ect a system in
which the government is only in charge of the direct costs (running a university).
The values for the active interest rates, both for the government and the private
sector, should be further discussed. First, the interest rate for the private sector is
set ‘su¢ciently high’ to …nance investment in human capital, since it is believed that
that is what is usually observed in the economies, revealing both the lack of incentive
to pay the debt once the investment has been done and the impossibility to grant
guarantees.
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Taking into account the rate that the government is charged with to …nance the
investment in human capital, two values were established. In principle, there are not
enough reasons to justify that the public sector can perform such task better than
the private sector. This argument is even stronger in developing countries, where
the institutional structure of the State is usually considerably weak. However, it is
possible to consider the advantage that may arise from using a taxation structure
(already established) and justify that ig be rather smaller than i.18 Finally, although
it is believed that the latter scenario would be the closest to reality, it was set that
ig = 0:3i to observe what happens if the governments achieve this task much better
than the private sector.
The values of salaries, the passive interest rate and the cost of education were
established at presumably reasonable values. Moreover, what was being sought with
these values was that the proportion of students under the uniform system were close
to what currently happens in Argentina (especially in the case where ig = 144%).
Once parameters values and the initial distribution of variables are established,
it is possible to compute economies under the di¤erent systems. In this case, it was
supposed that the economy comprises 5000 agents, who leave di¤erent inheritances
to their children according to the economy decision of investing in human capital.
This economy is computed from t = 0 to t = 35, where it can already be observed
that the values of the variables become stabilized.
Next, there is a presentation of the results arising from comparing the distributions
of each generation in terms of inequality, poverty, equity, wealth as well as average
utility and welfare.
4.2.1 Inequality
It is usual in economics to consider inequality of income or of individual welfare
as an indicator of society’s welfare. In this case, the resulting inequality between
the di¤erent schemes is measured according to the most used indicators for this task:
Gini’s coe¢cient and Atkinson’s index with parameters of aversion to inequality equal
to 1 and 2.
The results, presented in Appendix B, show that according to inequality, the
system of taxes imposed to the graduate is the best, and the one of uniform taxation
is the worst.
18Notwithstanding, it is really di¢cult that using the ‘o¢cial structure’ solves the main problems
that exist in …nancing investment in human capital (there is no guarantee and the assets invested
are not to be expropriated).
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Conclusion 3 The distribution of income resulting from the system of uniform tax-
ation is the most unequal, followed by the system of total feeing and …nally by the one
of graduates taxation.
This result originates from the fact that in the system of uniform taxation, the
poor will …nance part of the education of the wealthy. Furthermore, the system of
graduates taxation is better in terms of equality than the feeing system, because,
even though the poor are always in the same condition, the wealthy are less wealthy,
because they pay a portion of their education with an interest rate higher than r (in
the three cases).
4.2.2 Poverty
Another concept that is usually related to the welfare of a society is poverty. The
proportion of poor people and the poverty depth are usually two topics of concern
for those in charge of designing economic policy.
In this case, measurements are made by means of three indicators: the incidence
rate (which measures the proportion of poor people), the poverty gap (which also
considers the amount of income left to come out of poverty) and Foster, Greer and
Thorbecke’s index (1984) (referred to as FGT) with ® = 2 (which increasingly con-
siders the poverty gap).
The poverty line has been de…ned with an intermediate value between [xncee ; x
c
ee(¯min)].
Consequently, the incidence rate also indicates the proportion of agents that do not
qualify
The results found, which are presented in the appendix, change according to the
indicator used. When only the amount of poor people is considered, the system of
uniform taxation is the best. However, when there is increasing overvaluation of the
poverty gap in the case where ig is similar to i, such system is the worst. In turn,
when considering ig = 54%, the feeing system is the worst.
Conclusion 4 The lowest proportion of poor people is achieved with the system of
uniform taxation, which means that this system maximizes the amount of students.
However, when the depth of poverty is being considered (FGT with ® = 2) in the
case with the most reasonable parameter values, the system of uniform taxation is the
worst.
As noticed in proposition 10, the system of uniform taxation is the one from which
results the lowest wealth for the poor. However, as it derives from proposition 9, in
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such system the proportion of poor people will be lower. Thus, the incidence rate
is lower in the uniform taxation system, but when poverty depth is considered that
system is worse than the others.
4.2.3 Equity
Although, generally, inequality and poverty are the preferred indicators for distribu-
tion considerations, there is an increasing agreement in the literature with respect to
the equality of opportunities as a conception of equity (Le Grand (1991), Benabou
(2000), Gasparini (2000) and Phelan (2002)).
Since equity is a normative concept, perhaps more related to ´fairness in income
distribution’ or ‘social justice’, the way to measure it has to be carefully de…ned. In
this case, taking into consideration that in a system in which there exists equality of
opportunities, those who earn the most (x or U) are the most skillful or those who
have greater tendency to make e¤orts (¯), the equity indicator to be used will be the
correlation between ¯ and x or U .
The results, presented in the appendix, show that equity is maximum in the two
cases of the distributions resulting from the feeing and graduates taxation systems,
and minimum in the case of uniform taxation.
Conclusion 5 From the point of view of equity, the feeing system and graduates
taxation system are the best, and the system of uniform taxation is the worst.
This result mainly arises from the fact that in the system of uniform taxation the
poor are poorer, and consequently, independently from its ¯ value, it will be more
di¢cult for them to study.
4.2.4 Wealth and utility average
A generalized manner to evaluate the performance of an economy is through its per
capita income. In this case, results are obtained from the wealth and utility means.
The …ndings obtained allow to conclude that according to this measurement of
welfare, the best system is that of total feeing in the case where i is similar to ig,
while the system of uniform taxation is better when this di¤erence is made larger. In
turn, it can be clearly observed when the mean utility of economy is being considered,
that the system of uniform taxation is the less bene…cial (except when ig = 54%).
Conclusion 6 The average wealth is higher in the feeing system, while according to
utility the system of uniform taxation is the worst (except when ig = 54%).
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These results arise from considering the di¤erence between ig and r, which are
the reference rates for the wealthy. When this di¤erence is very signi…cant, the feeing
system is the best; while when they are similar, the fact that in the system of uniform
taxation the amount of students is higher improves the average wealth level of this
system. In turn, this system is the worst in terms of utility since the poor are poorer,
which is considerably re‡ected in terms of utility since the function is concave.
4.2.5 Welfare
A frequent way of evaluating an economy is through a function of social welfare in
the Bergson-Samuelson way (W ), which adds the individual levels of life.
W = W (U1; U2; :::UN)
As Gasparini and Sosa Escudero (2001) mentioned, these functions are useful as
an instrument at the disposal of the analyst or the policy maker to evaluate the global
welfare of an economy. Since this exercise necessarily implies the addition of levels
of individual lives, function W proposes an ordered and consistent way of doing this
exercise.
A function that turns out to be considerably useful and used is the Atkinson basic
principles.
Wa(") =
Ã
1
N
NX
i=1
Y 1¡"i
1¡ "
!1¡"
for " ¸ 0; " 6= 0
Wa(" = 0) is replaced by lnWa =
1
N
NX
i=1
ln yi
where parameter " is de…ned as a measurement of aversion to inequality. Based on
this de…nition, a Rawlsian welfare function can be found when " =1, an utilitarian
or in the Bentham’s way when " = 0 and the following function summarized in the
mean and Atkinson’s inequality index when " = 1,2.
Wa(") = ¹(1¡A(")) with " = 1,2
Where ¹ is the mean of distribution and A(") is Atkinson’s inequality index with
aversion to inequality ".
The results are presented in the appendix according to these four de…nitions of
welfare (utilitaran, rawlsian, Atkinson " = 1 and " = 2), together with two functions
de…ned according to the mean and the Gini by Sen and Kakwani, respectively
Ws = ¹(1¡G)
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Wk =
¹
1 +G
where G is Gini’s inequality index.
Finally, from comparing the di¤erent systems according to the di¤erent represen-
tations of society’s welfare, it comes out that in all the cases the feeing or graduates
´taxation systems are better than the system of uniform taxation. While in the cases
where i is similar to ig the system of uniform taxation is clearly the worst; in the
case where ig = 54% it is found to be in an intermediate position after the system of
graduates taxation. The latter is the one which appears most frequently as the best
system.
Conclusion 7 In terms of welfare, all functions indicate that the system of uniform
taxation is worse than the feeing or graduates taxation systems. Between the other
two, most of the functions show that the system of graduates taxation is the best.
These results, when jointly considering inequality and the level of utility, provide
their own explanations. Since the system of graduates taxation is the best in most
cases in terms of inequality, and the utility average level resulting from establishing
this system is also the best or similar to it, when speaking in terms of welfare it
frequently appears as the most bene…cial for society.
5 The Political Economy of the Reform
In some cases, although change a system can be better , to do it can be very di¢cult.
The form to analyse this in economics is called “political economy”. This section
present a simple view on this topic to a reform of Universitary …nancing system.
Simply using some previous results, it is possible to order the preferences of the
three groups of agents: unskill, skill lenders and skill borrowers. The results of this
exercise, which is made in the Appendix C, are presented in the next table.
Table 1: Ordering the preferences
Group 1st 2nd 3th
Unskill A = G U
Skill borrowers U G A
Skill lenders A or U G
Note: A=feeing, G=graduates taxation and
U=uniform taxation.
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As a consequence of their utilities, unskill will be indi¤erent between two systems:
feeing and graduates taxation. Skill lenders prefer uniform taxation or feeing , de-
pending on the interest rates, to the other. Finally, borrowers prefer uniform taxation
to graduates taxation, being the feeing system the worst scheme.
6 Discussion of the basic assumptions
The results previously presented are as valid and convincing as the model from which
they are derived. This is relevant for comparing the model with other ways of ex-
plaining the …nancing of investment in human capital and besides, for considering
the discrepancies between the model and the real economy.
Regarding other alternatives to explain the …nancing of investment in human
capital, there are in the literature a large number of structures, among which, those
used by Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) and Caucutt and Kumar (2000) have been
previously highlighted. The proposals evaluated here have not yet been analized in
either work, and their development would be signi…cantly useful in order to compare
the results.
At least two remarkable discrepancies exist between the real economy and the
model presented here.
In the …rst place, it has been supposed that the non-quali…ed salaries do not di¤er
in their abilities, which does not occur in the real economy.
In the second place, it has been supposed that there is no uncertainty as to whether
students will end their university course of studies or not.
Even though it is possible to surmise that such modi…cations will not change the
results, advancing in both directions will surely contribute to study the alternatives
of university …nancing proposed. Notwithstanding, as far as there is no model de-
velopment or sound theoretical explanations in order to approach the evaluation of
alternatives of university …nancing from which di¤erent results will be obtained, the
conclusions found are considered to be worthy.
7 Comments for Argentina
Taking into consideration the system of uniform taxation as a simpli…cation of a
system like the Argentinean, where the funds derive from a relatively uniform taxation
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system according to income levels19, it is possible to …nd some conclusions to debate
the alternatives of university …nancing in Argentina.
The results from the comparison allow us to conclude that in those scenarios clos-
est to the reality of the model previously presented, the system of taxes to graduates
is the best in terms of welfare. In turn, it has been found that a system of …nanc-
ing with a uniform tax is worse than the system of graduates taxation, in terms of
inequality, poverty (considering its intensity), equity and growth. In that sense, the
only justi…cation to maintain a system of uniform taxation is that it maximizes the
amount of students that attend university.
In addition, the results from the political economy analysis, help to understand
the obstacles associated to a reform.
Generally, the poor students (the group of skill borrowers in our analysis) are the
ones who have more in‡uence in the university political parties. From our model,
their position against any reform of the universitary …nancing system, is a rational
decision. The unskill group is the one who should support any reform. However,
usually they are not taken into account in the decision of what …nancing system is
preferred. Finally, the model predicts a logic behaviour for the group of skill lenders.
Contrary to the unskill, this group will prefer a reform only to the feeing system.
As they are better in the status quo than under a graduate taxation system, their
interest to the reform is not so strong.
The last messages from this papers is that ‘in Argentina, the group of unskill
agents are the majority and therefore, a reform in which inequality, poverty (consid-
ering its intensity), equity and growth improve, could be done, if the issue is put to
the vote and this group votes rationally.
19Gasparini (1998) shows that the Argentinean taxation system is relatively uniform with respect
to the current income.
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8 Appendix A
8.1 Proof of proposition 1
Proof. According to assumption 1 we know that ¯minws ¸ h(1+ r)+wu(2+ r), con-
sequently those who have xt ¸ h will prefer to invest in human capital (independently
from ¯i). Thus, in order to …nd the level of initial wealth from which agents choose
to receive education, we have to compare Usb and Uu to …nd the level of x for which
it is veri…ed that U sb ¸ Uu. Considering that the less the proportion of resources for
education that are not their own funds the less income-producing deciding to study
turns out to be, the minimun x level for which studying is more bene…cial in terms
of utility will be found
U sb = ln [ws¯ + (x¡ h)(1 + i)] + " ¸ Uu = ln [(xt + wu) (1 + r) + wu] + "
ln [ws¯ + (x¡ h)(1 + i)] + " ¸ ln [(xt + wu) (1 + r) + wu] + "
ln [ws¯ + (x¡ h)(1 + i)] ¸ ln [(xt + wu) (1 + r) + wu]
ws¯ + (x¡ h)(1 + i) ¸ (x+ wu) (1 + r) + wu
ws¯ ¡ wu ¡ wu(1 + r)¡ h(1 + i) ¸ x(1 + r)¡ x(1 + i)
ws¯ ¡ wu(2 + r)¡ h(1 + i) ¸ x(r ¡ i)
x(i¡ r) ¸ wu(2 + r) + h(1 + i)¡ ws¯
q(¯) ¸ [wu(2 + r) + h(1 + i)¡ ws¯]
(i¡ r)
8.2 Proof of proposition 2
Proof. In the …rst place we have to assume that (1¡ ®) (1 + r) < 1 < (1¡ ®) (1 + i).
Then, from the equations that re‡ect the dynamics of wealth, it is possible to pose
the following equations
xut+1 = (1¡ ®)(1 + r)xt + wu(2 + r)(1¡ ®)
xsbt+1 = (1¡ ®)(1 + i)xt + (1¡ ®) [ws¯ ¡ h(1 + i)]
xslt+1 = (1¡ ®)(1 + r)xt + (1¡ ®) [ws¯ ¡ h(1 + r)]
if xt < q(¯)
if q(¯) · xt < h
if h · xt
We will notice that it is possible to …nd point ½i since it is the value/where the
following takes place
bsb(xt) = xt
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(1¡ ®) [ws¯ + (xt ¡ h)(1 + i)] = xt
(1¡ ®) [ws¯ + (xt ¡ h)(1 + i)] = xt
(1¡ ®)ws¯ + (1¡ ®)(xt ¡ h)(1 + i) = xt
(1¡ ®)xt(1 + i)¡ xt = h(1 + i)(1¡ ®)¡ (1¡ ®)ws¯
xt [(1¡ ®)(1 + i)¡ 1] = (1¡ ®) [h(1 + i)¡ ws¯]
½(¯) = xt =
(1¡ ®) [h(1 + i)¡ ws¯]
[(1¡ ®)(1 + i)¡ 1]
8.3 Proof of proposition 3
Proof. These values are derived from levelling the /inheritance functions with the
initial wealth level. For xu this is
bu(xt) = xt
(1¡ ®) [(xt + wu) (1 + r) + wu] = xt
(1¡ ®) (xt + wu) (1 + r) + (1¡ ®)wu = xt
(1¡ ®)xt(1 + r) + (1¡ ®)wu(1 + r) + (1¡ ®)wu = xt
(1¡ ®)wu(1 + r) + (1¡ ®)wu = xt ¡ (1¡ ®)xt(1 + r)
(1¡ ®)(2 + r)wu = xt [1¡ (1¡ ®)(1 + r)]
xuee =
(1¡ ®)(2 + r)wu
[1¡ (1¡ ®)(1 + r)]
Note that xu is not a function of ¯.
8.4 Proof of proposition 4
Proof. According to …gure 2 the following has to be levelled
bsl(xt) = xt
(1¡ ®) [ws¯ + (xt ¡ h)(1 + r)] = xt
(1¡ ®)ws¯ + (1¡ ®)xt(1 + r)¡ h(1¡ ®)(1 + r) = xt
(1¡ ®)ws¯ ¡ h(1¡ ®)(1 + r) = xt ¡ (1¡ ®)xt(1 + r)
(1¡ ®) [ws¯ ¡ h(1 + r)] = xt [1¡ (1¡ ®)(1 + r)]
xslee(¯) =
(1¡ ®) [ws¯ ¡ h(1 + r)]
[1¡ (1¡ ®)(1 + r)]
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8.5 Proof of proposition 5
Proof. In order to …nd the value of qt the following has to be done,
U sb= ln [ws¯i(1¡ ¿ut ) + (x¡ h(1¡ s))(1 + i)]+" = Uu= ln [(x+ wu) (1 + r) + wu(1¡ ¿ut )] +"
ws¯i(1¡ ¿ut ) + (x¡ h(1¡ s))(1 + i) = (x+ wu) (1 + r) + wu(1¡ ¿ut )
x(i¡ r) = wu(2 + r ¡ ¿ut ) + h(1¡ s)(1 + i)¡ ws¯i(1¡ ¿ut )
qut (¯) =
wu(2 + r ¡ ¿ut ) + h(1¡ s)(1 + i)¡ ws¯i(1¡ ¿ut )
i¡ r
8.6 Proof of proposition 6
Proof. In order to obtain ½ the following has to be done
x = (1¡ ®) [ws¯(1¡ ¿u) + (x¡ h(1¡ s))(1 + i)]
x¡ x(1 + i)(1¡ ®) = (1¡ ®) [ws¯(1¡ ¿u)¡ h(1¡ s)(1 + i)]
½u(¯) =
(1¡ ®) [ws¯(1¡ ¿u)¡ h(1¡ s)(1 + i)]
1¡ (1 + i)(1¡ ®)
According to …gure 2, in order to …nd the limit level of wealth of the non-quali…ed
people, the following has to be levelled
bu(xt) = xt
(1¡ ®) [(xt + wu) (1 + r) + wu(1¡ ¿u)] = xt
(1¡ ®) (xt + wu) (1 + r) + (1¡ ®)wu(1¡ ¿u) = xt
(1¡ ®)xt(1 + r) + (1¡ ®)wu(1 + r) + (1¡ ®)wu(1¡ ¿u) = xt
(1¡ ®)wu(1 + r) + (1¡ ®)wu(1¡ ¿u) = xt ¡ (1¡ ®)xt(1 + r)
(1¡ ®)(2 + r ¡ ¿u)wu = xt [1¡ (1¡ ®)(1 + r)]
xu;uee =
(1¡ ®)(2 + r ¡ ¿u)wu
1¡ (1¡ ®)(1 + r)
In order to …nd the limit level of wealth of the quali…ed, the following has to be done
bsl(xt) = xt
(1¡ ®) fws¯(1¡ ¿u) + [xt ¡ h(1¡ s)] (1 + r)g = xt
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(1¡ ®)ws¯(1¡ ¿u) + (1¡ ®)(1 + r)xt ¡ h(1¡ s)(1¡ ®)(1 + r) = xt
(1¡ ®) [ws¯(1¡ ¿u)¡ h(1¡ s)(1 + r)] = xt ¡ (1¡ ®)xt(1 + r)
(1¡ ®) [ws¯(1¡ ¿u)¡ h(1¡ s)(1 + r)] = xt [1¡ (1¡ ®)(1 + r)]
xsl;uee (¯) =
(1¡ ®) [ws¯(1¡ ¿u)¡ h(1¡ s)(1 + r)]
1¡ (1¡ ®)(1 + r)
8.7 Proof of proposition 7
Proof. In order to …nd the value of qt the following has to be done,
U sb= ln [ws¯i(1¡ ¿ gt ) + (x¡ h(1¡ s))(1 + i)]+" = Uu= ln [(x+ wu) (1 + r) + wu)] +"
ws¯i(1¡ ¿ gt ) + (x¡ h(1¡ s))(1 + i) = (x+ wu) (1 + r) + wu
x(i¡ r) = wu(2 + r) + h(1¡ s)(1 + i)¡ ws¯i(1¡ ¿ gt )
qgt (¯) =
wu(2 + r) + h(1¡ s)(1 + i)¡ ws¯i(1¡ ¿ gt )
i¡ r
8.8 Proof of proposition 8
Proof. In order to obtain ½ the following has to be done
x = (1¡ ®) [ws¯(1¡ ¿ g) + (x¡ h(s))(1 + i)]
x¡ x(1 + i)(1¡ ®) = (1¡ ®) [ws¯(1¡ ¿ g)¡ h(s)(1 + i)]
½g(¯) =
(1¡ ®) [ws¯(1¡ ¿ g)¡ h(s)(1 + i)]
1¡ (1 + i)(1¡ ®)
According to …gure 2, in order to …nd the limit level of wealth of the non quali…ed,
the following has to be levelled
bu(xt) = xt
(1¡ ®) [(x+ wu) (1 + r) + wu] = xt
(1¡ ®) (x+ wu) (1 + r) + (1¡ ®)wu = x
(1¡ ®)x(1 + r) + (1¡ ®)wu(1 + r) + (1¡ ®)wu = x
(1¡ ®)wu(1 + r) + (1¡ ®)wu = x¡ (1¡ ®)x(1 + r)
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(1¡ ®)(2 + r)wu = xt [1¡ (1¡ ®)(1 + r)]
xu;gee =
(1¡ ®)(2 + r)wu
1¡ (1¡ ®)(1 + r)
In order to …nd the limit level of wealth those quali…ed, the following has to be done
bsl(xt) = xt
(1¡ ®) fws¯i(1¡ ¿ g) + (x¡ h(1¡ s))(1 + r)g = xt
(1¡ ®)ws¯(1¡ ¿ g) + (1¡ ®)(1 + r)xt ¡ h(1¡ s)(1¡ ®)(1 + r) = xt
(1¡ ®) [ws¯(1¡ ¿ g)¡ h(1¡ s)(1 + r)] = xt ¡ (1¡ ®)xt(1 + r)
(1¡ ®) [ws¯(1¡ ¿ g)¡ h(1¡ s)(1 + r)] = xt [1¡ (1¡ ®)(1 + r)]
xsl;gee (¯) =
(1¡ ®) [ws¯(1¡ ¿ g)¡ h(1¡ s)(1 + r)]
1¡ (1¡ ®)(1 + r)
8.9 Proof of proposition 9
Proof. First, it is possible to state that
½g(¯ = 0) = ½u(¯ = 0) < ½a(¯ = 0)
(1¡ ®)h(1¡ s)(1 + i)
[(1¡ ®)(1 + i)¡ 1] <
(1¡ ®)h(1 + i)
[(1¡ ®)(1 + i)¡ 1]
(1¡ s) < 1
s > 0
In addition,
¯(½u = 0) < ¯(½g = 0) < ¯(½a = 0)
h(1¡ s)(1 + i)
(1¡ ¿u)ws <
h(1¡ s)(1 + i)
(1¡ ¿ g)ws
¿ g > ¿u
replacing
(1 + ig)hs
ws
>
(1 + ig)hs
hR ¯max
¯min
R1
½u(¯)mt(x k ¯)dxd¯
i
h
ws
hR ¯max
¯min
R1
½u(¯)mt(x k ¯)dxd¯
i
+ wu(1 - Pee)
i
Z ¯max
¯min
Z 1
½u(¯)
mt(x k ¯)dxd¯ + wu(1 - Pee)
ws
>
Z ¯max
¯min
Z 1
½u(¯)
mt(x k ¯)dxd¯
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wu(1 - Pee)
ws
> 0
that is true due to the assumption 4.
Finally
h(1¡ s)(1 + i)
(1¡ ¿ g)ws <
h(1 + i)
ws
(1¡ s) < (1¡ ¿ g)
s > ¿ g
ws b¯g > (1 + ig)h
that is true due to the assumptions 3.
8.10 Proof of proposition 10
Proof. It is proved that
xu;aee = x
u;g
ee =
(1¡ ®)(2 + r)wu
1¡ (1¡ ®)(1 + r)
In turn,
xu;uee =
(1¡ ®)(2 + r ¡ ¿u)wu
1¡ (1¡ ®)(1 + r) < x
nc;a
ee = x
nc;g
ee
(1¡ ®)(2 + r ¡ ¿u)wu
1¡ (1¡ ®)(1 + r) <
(1¡ ®)(2 + r)wu
1¡ (1¡ ®)(1 + r)
(2 + r ¡ ¿u)wu < (2 + r)wu
¿uwu > 0
8.11 Proof of proposition 11
Proof. It is con…rmed that xsl;uee > xsl;gee provided the following takes place
xsl;uee (
b¯) = (1 - ®)
h
ws b¯(1 - ¿u) - h(1 - s)(1 + r)i
1 - (1 - ®)(1 + r)
>
xsl;gee (
b¯) = (1 - ®)
h
ws b¯(1 - ¿ g) - h(1 - s)(1 + r)i
1 - (1 - ®)(1 + r)
(1 - ®)
h
ws b¯(1 - ¿u) - h(1 - s)(1 + r)i
1 - (1 - ®)(1 + r)
>
(1 - ®)
h
ws b¯(1 - ¿ g) - h(1 - s)(1 + r)i
1 - (1 - ®)(1 + r)
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h
ws b¯(1 - ¿u) - h(1 - s)(1 + r)i > hws b¯(1 - ¿ g) - h(1 - s)(1 + r)i
ws b¯¿ g > ws b¯ ¿u
¿ g > ¿u
that is stated in the proof of proposition 9.
8.12 Proof of proposition 12
Proof. It is con…rmed that xsl;aee > x
sl;g
ee since ig > r (notice that here the comparison
is made for ¯ considering the level of the mean of those who study in the system of
graduates taxation).
xsl;aee (
b¯g) =(1 - ®)
h
ws b¯g - h(1 + r)i
1 - (1 - ®)(1 + r)
> xsl;gee (
b¯g) =(1 - ®)
h
ws b¯g(1 - ¿ g) - h(1 - s)(1 + r)i
1 - (1 - ®)(1 + r)
(1 - ®)
h
ws b¯g - h(1 + r)i
1 - (1 - ®)(1 + r)
>
(1 - ®)
h
ws b¯g(1 - ¿ g) - h(1 - s)(1 + r)i
1 - (1 - ®)(1 + r)h
ws b¯g - h(1 + r)i > hws b¯g(1 - ¿ g) - h(1 - s)(1 + r)i
ws b¯g¿ g > hs(1 + r)
ws b¯g (1 + ig)hsPee
wsPee b¯g > hs(1 + r)
(1 + ig) > (1 + r)
ig > r
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9 Appendix B
9.1 Inequality
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Figure 4:
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Case 2
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9.2 Poverty
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Case 2
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9.3 Equity
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9.4 Average of wealth and utility
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Case 2
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9.5 Welfare
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Case 2
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10 Appendix C
It is possible to order the preferences of the three groups of agents with the utility
function. To unskill agents, we have
Uu;a = ln [(x+ wnc) (1 + r) + wnc] + "
Uu;g = ln [(x+ wnc) (1 + r) + wnc] + "
Uu;u = ln [(x+ wnc) (1 + r) + wnc(1¡ ¿ut )] + "
so Uu;a = Uu;g > Uu;u:
To those with xt ¸ h
U sl;a = ln [wc¯ + (x - h)(1 + r)] + "
Usl;u = ln [wc¯i(1¡ ¿ut ) + (x¡ h(1¡ s))(1 + r)] + "
Usl;g = ln [wc¯i(1¡ ¿ gt ) + (x¡ h(1¡ s))(1 + r)] + "
As ¿ g > ¿u so Usl;u > Usl;g. In addition, as ig > r so Usl;a > U sl;g. Between
U sl;u and U sl;a it is possible to state that U sl;a > Usl;u if (1 + ig)A > (1 + r) where
A = wc
b¯Puee
wnc(1 - Puee)+wcb¯Puee .
To the borrowers agents we have to compare
Usb;a = ln [wc¯ + (x - h)(1 + i)] + "
U sb;u = ln [wc¯i(1¡ ¿ut ) + (x¡ h(1¡ s))(1 + i)] + "
U sb:g = ln [wc¯i(1¡ ¿ gt ) + (x¡ h(1¡ s))(1 + i)] + "
First, we have that U sb;u > U sb;g because ¿ g > ¿u: Then, comparing between U sb;u
and Usb;a, we have that U sl;u > U sl;a because (1 + i) > (1 + ig)A: Finally, as i > ig
we have that U c;g > U c;a
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